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Introduction
The characteristics, assets and economic performance of Chile’s regions
are particularly diverse, and their potential for growth will largely depend on
how public policies are adapted to their diversity and integrate their different
synergies, attributes and assets. Enhancing the productivity and
competitiveness of specific regions and sectors requires agile, responsive
institutional arrangements that can make targeted efforts to improve the
quality of specific public investments and services. This chapter considers the
multi-level governance system required to support a better match between
public policies and territorial needs in the search for better regional
performance. The first part of the chapter (Section 3.1) looks at how fiscal and
administrative limitations on sub-national governments may undermine the
feasibility of moving towards a territorial approach to economic development.
This possibility has led to a debate in Chile regarding the use of decentralisation
to improve regional performance and competitiveness. Section 3.2 discusses
some issues that could make a difference to the effectiveness of Chile’s
governance reforms. Efficient decentralisation reform will require a clear
definition of the roles of the different actors and instruments for achieving co-
operation and co-ordination among them. In addition, national institutions
will need to have confidence in the soundness of the reform and in the
competence of regional institutions. Capacity building and the use of
performance indicators could help in this respect. Strengthened multi-level
co-ordination and co-operation arrangements and bottom-up participative
mechanisms will be also needed to manage co-operation and co-ordination
among the different actors. All these elements appear to be crucial for
strengthening the legitimacy, coherence and effectiveness of the reform
process. The section concludes that the creation of a governance structure
capable of context-sensitive responses requires strengthening the reforms
undertaken by the current government and developing a solid and enhanced
governance structure at sub-national level.
3.1. A centralised system engaged in a reform debate
Chile is a unitary state with a fairly centralised structure: from the
capital, Santiago, the central government exercises control over Chile’s
territories. Chile is currently divided into 15 regions, which are further divided
into 52 provinces and 345 municipalities (comunas). Each level has its own
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governance structure. The regional level has two categories of actors:
deconcentrated and decentralised. The former are representatives of the
national government and include: an intendant (the direct representative of
the President of the Republic in each of the regions), ministerial regional
secretaries (SEREMIS), and regional representatives of the national public
agencies (Corfo, Indap, Fosis, among others) involved in delivering key public
services. The decentralised regional government (GORE) consists of the
intendant and the regional council. The intendant heads the regional council,
acting both as the main representative of the central government and as co-
ordinator of regional policies. Members of the regional council are elected
indirectly by the municipal councilmen of the provinces, although there is a
reform under way to elect them directly. The composition, organisation and
functions of the different levels of governments are summarised in Table 1.1.
Two-thirds of OECD countries are considered unitary states. Yet, the
administrative structure of OECD countries is far from homogeneous; there
are different degrees of allocation of responsibilities to sub-national
administrative tiers so that they range from unitary to regionalised to federal
countries (Table 3.1). What defines both federal and regionalised countries is
the existence of a regional, directly elected tier of government with
constitutional status and wide-ranging autonomy and legislative powers
relative to the administrative territory. What distinguishes federal states is the
co-existence of sovereignties: the regional tier exists in its own right and
cannot be abolished or restructured by the federal government (OECD, 2001).
Centralisation has traditionally been associated in Chile with economic
efficiency and political stability. However, administrative and fiscal limitations
on regional and municipal governments may be undermining their ability to
carry out some of their responsibilities efficiently, thereby creating a failure to
take advantage of specific regional and local opportunities. This has led to a
debate in Chile regarding the changes that can be made in the governance
structure to improve the performance of sub-national governments.
Table 3.1. The administrative structure of OECD countries
State structure Total Country
Federal 8 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Switzerland, United States.
Regionalised 2 Italy, Spain.
Unitary 20 Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom.
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Administrative and financial challenges for sub-national governments
Administrative challenges
Within the current centralised system, the main regional public actors
remain largely bound by national guidelines. The head of the regional
government, the intendant, is named by the President. The intendant’s main
role as head of the regional government is to work to develop the region. Yet,
as the president’s representative, he is also responsible for implementing
national policies and guidelines. Decisions regarding the official designation
or removal of intendants are political in nature and this sometimes affects
how they manage their region. The problem of divided loyalty (to the central
state and to the region) also exists among deconcentrated public servants in
the regions: even if they are called to assist the intendant in all matters of
preparation, execution and co-ordination of policies within their purview, they
mainly follow the guidelines of their respective national agency.
Co-ordination of the different actors and policies in the regional
government is a main challenge for the system. The regional government still
does not have enough institutional strength to manage and co-ordinate a
common strategy for the region that draws the various agencies and actors
together. For example, intendants sometimes learn about projects to be
carried out by a national agency in their region only when these are about to
be implemented. This situation affects the capacity to provide a coherent
framework for formulating regional policies.
In recent years Chile has undertaken several reforms and has made
progress towards a more territorial approach to economic development
through a number of programmes and initiatives. However, these attempts are
hampered by the lack of an institutional framework at the regional level for co-
ordinating territorial policies, by insufficient participation by regional actors,
and by the tight framework established by national guidelines. Most of the
programmes designed to promote economic development in the regions are
designed at the national level, with insufficient participation by the regional
governments and institutions in their design and co-ordination.
Furthermore, some initiatives with a regional orientation such as the
regional development agencies (RDAs) still appear fairly constrained by the
national productive agenda.
The role of the regional government should be further strengthened. On
the one hand, regional management should be more clearly distinguished
from national representation. There is also a need to strengthen the links
between and co-ordination of the deconcentrated national agencies and the
regional government in order to develop harmonised regional agendas. Multi-
level governance arrangements would be crucial in these efforts (see the
discussion in the following sections).
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Financial challenges
Sub-national governments in Chile depend largely on central government
transfers for their budgets as they have few autonomous sources of revenue.
Municipalities are the only sub-national unit with the ability to collect
revenues from taxes. Sub-national revenues in Chile account for only 8.1% of
total government revenues and sub-national expenditures amount to 13.2%,1
very low figures in comparison to OECD countries where, on average, one-
third of public expenditures and one-quarter of public revenues occur at the
sub-national level. Only Greece and Luxembourg have less sub-national fiscal
autonomy than Chile (see Figure 3.1).
Municipal government budgets depend largely on resources from
national transfers (especially for education and primary health care, their
main devolved responsibilities) and on inter-municipal transfers from a
municipal equalisation system, the Inter-municipal Common Fund (FCM)
(see Box 3.1). Locally collected taxes represent on average only 36.9% of total
municipal revenues (only 17.5% if national transfers for municipal education
and basic health are included) (Table 3.2).2
Figure 3.1. Fiscal decentralisation OECD countries and Chile
Share of sub-national government in general government revenues and expenditure, 
20051
1. Or latest year available: 2003 for Canada and New Zealand, 2004 for Japan and Korea.
2. Excluding transfers received from other levels of government.
3. Excluding transfers paid to other levels of government. Figures for Chile are estimations based on
IMF, Government Finance Statistic Yearbook.
4. The share of sub-national revenues is expressed as a percentage of total government mainland
revenues.
Source: OECD National Accounts database; Statistics Norway; Statistics Canada; US Bureau of
Economic Analysis; Chile: IMF, Government Finance Statistic Yearbook.
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Small and poor municipalities with few sources of local revenue are very
dependent on the FCM. According to the National System of Municipal
Indicators (SNIM), only 48 municipalities (out of a total of 345) receive more
than 50% of their budget from their own permanent or long-term resources. By
contrast 147 receive 20% or less from their own resources (i.e. 80% comes from
national transfers and the FCM). Additionally, an important share of
municipal revenues (15.9%) comes from the property tax, but the high
Box 3.1. The Inter-municipal Common Fund 
(Fondo Común Municipal)
How the money is collected: Municipalities contribute a fixed share of the
revenues collected from the main taxes: 60% of the property tax (65% in the
four richer municipalities), 62.5% of the motor vehicle tax, 50% of the tax for
vehicle transfers, and 100% of traffic fines. The four municipalities with the
bigger income also contribute between 55 and 65% of the revenues from fees
for commercial licences. The national government’s contribution to the fund
is fixed annually. In 2006 it only accounted for 1.5% of the FCM.
How the money is distributed: In 2008 a law defining new criteria was
approved. The distribution is as follows: i) 25% is equally divided among the
communes; ii) 10% is given in proportion to the poor population of the
commune, weighted as a share of the country’s population; iii) 30% goes in
direct proportion to the land or properties exempted from territorial taxes;
and iv) 35% goes to the municipalities with the smallest municipal
permanent income per habitant (mostly municipal taxes).
Source: OECD based on information provided from Subdere and Asociación Chilena de
Municipalidades.
Table 3.2. Main sources of municipal revenues (2006)
Percentage
Source Share
Share including national transfers 
to health and education
Autonomous revenues – municipal taxes 36.9 17.5
Business tax (15.8) (7.5)
Property tax (15.9) (7.5)
Municipal rights, traffic tickets, etc. 16.9 8
Inter-municipal transfers: FCM 38.6 18.3
External transfers 7.6 3.6
National transfers to education and health 
municipal system
– 52.6
Total 100 100
Source: National System of Municipal Indicators (SINIM) based on BEP.
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percentage of exempt (low-income) properties3 in the poorest comunas means
low permanent revenues for these localities.
The FCM acts as a municipal redistribution fund to compensate for the
wide disparities among Chilean municipalities. Its main objective is to ensure
that all of the country’s municipalities can fulfil their objectives and function
adequately. This fund also compensates municipalities for the land or
properties exempted from the property tax (as the exemption significantly
lowers municipal revenues, especially those of poorest localities). Yet some
observers suggest that the resulting transfers are still insufficient to cover
their operating costs adequately (Zegras and Gakenheimer, 2000).
Sub-national governments in Chile (both municipalities and regional
governments) have additional limitations on their access to resources. They
cannot request private credits or negotiate loans from international
organisations (even if loans from international organisations negotiated by
the central government are used in regions/localities). Moreover, sub-national
governments do not have the right to introduce additional taxes. This creates
a high degree of sub-national dependence on external transfers and thus
budgetary uncertainty because the amounts received vary from year to year.
These financial limitations undermine the ability of municipal
governments to carry out their devolved responsibilities efficiently. Ideally, the
assignment of responsibilities to municipalities should be accompanied by a
concomitant allocation of the resources, competences and organisational
flexibility needed to carry them out efficiently. One of the main goals of the
proposed municipal reform (discussed below) addresses this important issue.
Poorer municipalities have neither the resources nor the incentives to
invest in local economic development initiatives. Only the richer localities can
afford to use their autonomous resources in this way. Most of the locally
available resources of the poorest localities go to municipal education and
health systems to complement transfers from the national level,4 leaving few
resources available for additional investment measures. A system of incentives
(linked to the FCM) or a special development fund might be considered to
encourage investments in local economic development initiatives and promote
endogenous growth in underperforming municipalities. 
The resources of regional governments largely come from transfers from
the central government (see Box 3.2). One of the regional government’s main
roles is to oversee annually determined national transfers for regionally
decided investments (mainly the FNDR), most of which finance local
initiatives. As pointed out in Chapter 2, while the regional government is an
actor in the assignment process, allocation of the resources is regulated by the
national budget law. The budget of the regional governments is largely
financed by sectorally driven national grants, and this tends to inhibit the
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presentation and financing of territorial investment initiatives. Additionally,
the framework of the National Investment System makes it difficult to move
towards a multi-annual budgeting/planning framework for implementing
local/regional policy. A gradual shift towards more comprehensive regional
investments would require adapting the investment process to a territorial
logic and to a multi-annual budgeting planning framework. Moreover it would
require evolving towards a solid regional governance structure able to create a
coherent framework for economic development. 
The fiscal and administrative limitations on regional and municipal
governments described above may undermine the feasibility of a territorial
approach to economic development. The question in Chile seems to be how to
secure an efficient allocation of responsibilities and resources to the sub-
national governments that allows place-based policies to improve the
competitiveness potential of the different regions, without compromising the
institutional and financial stability reached in recent years. It is in this context
that the debate on decentralisation has emerged in Chile.
The decentralisation debate
Historically, the Chilean deconcentration and decentralisation process has
been guided more by efforts to improve the central state’s control over the regions
than by an attempt to transfer responsibilities to the regions and municipalities.
During the last 30 years the process mainly involved deconcentration of functions
to territorial units, yet several responsibilities, particularly primary and
secondary education and basic health, were devolved to municipal governments:
● Between 1974 and 1976, some steps towards deconcentration were taken:
division of the country into regions, provinces and municipalities, all of
Box 3.2. Regional government resources
● Transfers from the central government (FNDR).
● Taxes, special regional rights and fees collected and distributed by
central government agencies and directed to the regions, among them:
❖ Mining patents: 50% of the income from mining patents is added to the
share of the FNDR of the region to which the patent is assigned.
❖ Tax on gambling casinos: 50% of the revenue from this tax goes to the
region in which the casino is located (to finance development of public
works). The other 50% goes to the comuna.
❖ Revenue from the sale of public physical properties: 65% goes to the
budget of the regional government in which the property is located.
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them headed by a person appointed by the junta militar; transfer of certain
responsibilities to the municipal level, especially for public education and
health. Yet the main objective of the territorial administration was to
maintain tight control over the territories. The intendants came from the
military and had few links to the regions to which they were appointed.
● With the arrival of democracy in 1992, municipal governments became
democratic: mayors and councillors were elected democratically. In 1993, a
constitutional law created the regional governments. The intendant was
still appointed by the president, but a regional council with members
elected by municipal councilmen of the provinces was created to supervise
the intendant.
During recent years, however, efforts have been made to further
decentralise in order to improve the efficiency of public management. This is
part of a worldwide devolutionary trend. Most OECD countries have
introduced significant decentralisation measures since the 1970s. As of the
early 1980s, Spain moved towards strong regional autonomy; Italy gave new
responsibilities to regions, including some legal powers; France launched two
decentralisation “acts”, the second of which entailed a change in the
constitution; the United Kingdom strongly modified its institutional
organisation by devolving an important level of autonomy to the “nations”
that are members of the Kingdom, especially to Scotland (see Box 3.3); Sweden
Box 3.3. Decentralisation in the United Kingdom
Government in the United Kingdom is centralised but the past decade has seen
significant devolution of decision making. Directly elected assemblies have been set
up in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and London now has its own assembly
and mayor. Changes in the eight regions of England outside of London (each with
populations of about five million) have been more complex and more pragmatic, but
demonstrate strong recognition of the importance of regional development.
Institutions differ from one region to the next, and the number of administrative
levels is not the same in urban and rural areas. Thus, the “nations” under the
responsibility of the government at Westminster have elected regional structures:
Scotland, Wales (no legislative powers) and Northern Ireland. This level of
government is not elected in the regions of England itself, however, where there
seems to be little demand for greater regional democracy: in a recent referendum, a
proposal to introduce an elected regional assembly for the North-East (Newcastle
region) was overwhelmingly defeated.
A hybrid structure has evolved, based initially on three organisations in each region:
● A government regional office (GO), headed by a senior civil servant from the
central government.
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established in 1999 four pilot regions based on “old” county councils or on
federations of municipalities. Fiscal decentralisation in OECD countries has
risen over time: from 1995 to 2005, most OECD countries increased both sub-
national revenues and expenditures or at least sub-national expenditures
(see Figure 3.2). During the same period, Chile’s fiscal decentralisation
Box 3.3. Decentralisation in the United Kingdom (cont.)
● A Regional Development Agency (RDA), set up and funded by the central government
and overseen by a board of directors from the region led by the private sector.
● A Regional Assembly, comprising about 100 nominees from local government,
academic institutions, business and voluntary organisations. These have proven
unwieldy, however, and current proposals include smaller regional boards
representing major interest groups.
Meanwhile, the government developed the concept of regional strategies, setting out
key aims and investment plans for the economy, spatial planning and public
investment in housing. Leadership of these has been spread across the RDAs, GOs and
regional assemblies, and their integration and compatibility have met with mixed
success. A government objective to reduce disparities in regional rates of economic
growth has also had mixed success, in part owing to the exceptional economic
performance of London and the south-east region. In 2007 the government began a new
“sub-national review”, building on this experience. It aimed to clarify roles and to
support policy making at the most effective spatial scale to enable regions and localities
to reach their full potential.
New reforms were initiated in 2007 under four main headings: empowering local
authorities to promote economic development and neighbourhood renewal;
supporting local authorities to work together at sub-regional scale; strengthening the
regional level; and reforming central government’s relations with regions and localities.
These reforms are intended to simplify and clarify and to recognise the principle of
subsidiarity in decision making. In practice, the key regional functions for economic,
spatial and housing strategies will now be brought together under the RDAs, suitably
reconfigured. One major success of the RDAs has been the introduction of “single pot”
funding by the central government, by combining the financial contributions of several
central departments and allowing RDAs wide discretion in how the total is used to meet
regional priorities.
A further important innovation at regional and local levels has been the introduction
of local area agreements. These are negotiated between regional government offices
and local partnerships led by municipalities, and provide financial allocations to meet
agreed objectives within locally initiated strategies. They combine output targets that
reflect both national and local priorities.
Source: UK Commission for Rural Communities. 
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increased by 1.1 percentage points on the revenues side, and 5.3 percentage
points on the expenditure side, showing a slightly rise in expenditures, which
was unaccompanied by a parallel raise in revenues. 
Chile’s current government has set high priority on decentralisation with
the aim of providing sub-national governments with the tools, capacities and
legitimacy to improve their autonomy and performance. Reforms under way
to this end (see Box 3.4) include election of the regional council directly
instead of indirectly by the municipal councilmen of the provinces, which will
create a democratically elected body for managing regional development.
Also, responsibility for regional planning has been transferred from the
National Planning Ministry (Mideplan) to the regional governments, and a new
regional planning division (the third division of the regional government) has
been established to manage it (see Box 3.5). These changes are expected to
increase institutional legitimacy and may help bring citizens and regional
authorities closer together. However, in spite of the decentralisation efforts,
progress is still modest and the territorial agenda remains still largely
controlled from the centre. 
Figure 3.2. Changes in the share of sub-national government contributions 
in total public revenues and spending in OECD countries and Chile
In percentage points, between 19951 and 20052
1. Or earliest year available: 1996 for Japan, 1999 for Portugal, 2000 for Greece and Hungary.
2. Or latest year available: 2003 for Canada and New Zealand, 2004 for Japan.
3. Excluding transfers received from other levels of government.
4. Excluding transfers paid to other levels of government.
5. Figures for Chile are estimations based on IMF, Government Finance Statistic Yearbook.
6. The share of sub-national revenues is expressed as a percentage of total government mainland
revenues.
Source: OECD National Accounts database; Statistics Norway; Statistics Canada; US Bureau of
Economic Analysis; Chile: IMF, Government Finance Statistic Yearbook.
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Box 3.4. Recent developments and prospects of the Chilean 
decentralisation process
Recent decentralisation reforms are part of a general strategy to be implemented from 2007
to 2010, which has five main axes:
1. Municipal reform. It comprises the reform (under way) of the organic constitutional law of
municipalities (LOCMUN) with three main objectives: i) to modernise municipal
organisation, liberalising the administration of human resources at municipal level and
improving the skills of municipal staff; ii) to make the organisation of municipalities more
adaptable: among other measures, giving legal personality to associations of municipalities
and offering them support; iii) to give more autonomy and further responsibilities to
municipalities: modifications to improve municipal fiscal revenues, and a redesign of the
FCM, among other measures.
2. Democratisation of regional councils. A reform that is under way will allow direct election
of regional councillors and thus create a more democratic body with closer ties to citizens.
This reform was approved by the chamber of deputies in January 2008 and is following the
legal procedure for approval by the Senate.
3. Devolution of responsibilities to regional and municipal governments. As of January 2007,
regional planning responsibilities were transferred from Mideplan to the regional
government, establishing the third division of the regional government. Further
responsibilities for training and tourism are to be devolved in the near future. Additionally, a
reform under way will transfer certain functions to the regional governments: development
of the regional zoning plan; design of regional productive development policies (innovation,
business competitiveness and capacity building, among others); proposal of programmes for
social risk sectors. Finally the implementation of some social programmes has been
transferred to the municipal governments, e.g. Programa Puente, Programa Vínculos.
4. Creation of two new regions. In December 2006, the Chilean congress passed a law creating
two new regions: Los Ríos (formed by the province of Valdivia, previously part of the region
of Los Lagos, and now the XIV region) and Arica y Parinacota (on the northern border with
Peru, formerly part of the region of Tarapacá and now the XV region). These regions were
added to the previous 13 regions. The new regions became operative in October 2007. The
main objective of the change in the political division of the country (which had not been
modified since the creation of the regions in 1974) was to set up a new public framework for
the new regional institutional model. The new regions begin with greater autonomy;
regional planning has already been transferred to them and is executed through the new
regional planning division of the regional government. Finally, the new regions emerged to
satisfy local demands for more representation in the Senate and better administration of
public funds.
5. Improve the skills and institutional capabilities of sub-national governments. This will be
done through processes of accreditation, incentives and continuous learning. The objective
is to strengthen the management capacity of sub-national governments.
Source: Subdere.
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The main targets of Chile’s decentralisation process
There are several reasons for the current reforms. Special emphasis was
placed on improving democracy and participation through decentralisation, but
there were also references to economic development and public management.
Subdere’s “El Chile Descentralizado Que Queremos” (Ministerio del Interior, 2001,
pp. 25) described the general objective of decentralisation in Chile as “to
contribute to the development of the country, by promoting institutional
reforms to recognise the right of regional and local citizens and institutions to
decide and plan their territorial affairs, especially those concerning economic,
social and cultural development”. More recently, regional competitiveness has
emerged as one of the main purposes of the proposed decentralisation
reforms. The overarching goal is better distribution of opportunities around
the country and greater equality. In this regard, the government’s
decentralisation reforms have three principal objectives: stronger democracy
and greater participation, more efficient public management and improved
regional competitiveness.
Stronger democracy and greater participation
One of the main goals of Chile’s decentralisation policy is to bring the
public decision-making process closer to citizens. With the arrival of
Box 3.5. The third division of the regional government
A process of transferring the responsibility of regional planning from the
regional offices of Mideplan (Serplac) to regional governments started in 2007,
and a specific division devoted to managing regional planning was created
within regional governments. This process required the regional governments
to satisfy three prerequisites. The first was a document specifying the
responsibilities to be transferred, why this would be beneficial to the region,
the human resources needed, and the different steps involved. This document
required approval by the regional council. The second was to set up an
institutional development plan in which the regional government established
the vision, strategic plan, human resource policies and administrative
procedures of the new division. This strategic plan has to be approved by each
intendant following a participatory process involving various stakeholders.
The third document was the work plan for the next two years. It had to be
approved by the planning ministry (Mideplan). All regions (at different stages)
carried out the procedure. Subdere led the process and allocated the financial
resources. At the same time, in conjunction with Mideplan, Subdere carried
out a training programme in regional development management for the staff
of the new regional branches. The transfer process continues in 2008.
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democracy in Chile, decentralisation was seen as a way to extend democracy
to the different territories, giving citizens a more active role in civic affairs.
Most empirical evidence and OECD countries’ experience (OECD, 2008a)
demonstrate that under certain circumstances (see Box 3.6) decentralisation
may enable citizens to hold local public officials accountable through the use
of elections, collective action and other democratic means. At the same time,
social participation and the interaction of public, private and social groups will
help the local government plan and implement public services more
effectively by improving information transfer, trust building, negotiation and
deliberation and by reducing intra-territorial tensions. All these link
democratic decentralisation to more effective administration. 
More efficient public management
Devolution will make it possible to adapt public policies more closely to
regions’ specific needs and to respond better to local demands. In this way,
decentralisation can help the public administration become more efficient.
Sub-national governments have an advantage over central governments in
terms of making use of local knowledge in local decision making and problem
solving. However, the relationship between decentralisation and administrative
efficiency in Chile, as in most OECD countries, is complex. First, it is important
to consider the nature of the specific collective goods and services. For some it
may make sense for the municipal or the regional government to take
increased responsibility for reasons of proximity or local knowledge, while
for others it may be the central governments that for reasons of scale or
capacity are in the best position to provide them efficiently. Second, the
achievement of administrative efficiency through decentralisation reforms
is likely to depend on the institutional capacity of the decentralised units to
act autonomously. Third, as already observed, efficient public management
in a decentralised context requires consistency between the devolved
responsibility and the financial and administrative means to carry out that
responsibility. Finally, most responsibilities and services require the
intervention and co-ordination of the different levels of government, which
in turn require multi-level governance arrangements. These key issues are
examined below.
Economic efficiency: improved regional competitiveness
Decentralisation is usually seen as a means to improve regions’
development, innovation and business creation. Devolved institutional
management can be better matched with the opportunities offered by the
different territories and make it easier to respond in a timely, flexible and
differentiated manner to their requirements and economic opportunities. In
Chile, this perception is combined with concern among some public actors
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Box 3.6. Decentralisation, democracy and participation
In spite of the mixed evidence, most empirical studies that rely on observations over time
find a positive correlation between decentralisation and government responsiveness
(Faguet, 2004; Bossert et al., 2003; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Shah, 1998). However,
decentralisation does not always further democracy even when local leaders are
democratically elected: in societies with severe political and economic inequalities,
decentralisation may exacerbate these inequalities if the reforms result in less effective
constraints on local oligarchies (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Platteau, 2004; Larson, 2003).
Some specific factors and conditions may help make the relationship between
decentralisation and democracy stronger: i) democratic local elections; ii) popular
participation and forums for inclusive decision making; and iii) transparent decision making.
i) Democratic local elections: Several authors have pointed to the importance of
competitive and contestable local elections as an institutional mechanism to counter
corruption and prevent the capture of local politics by elites (Ribot, 2002; Blair, 2000,
Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Crook and Manor, 1998; and Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Moreover,
the rules of the democratic process and proximity to the local citizenry can produce
strong incentives for local politicians to respond to local concerns, needs and
preferences.
ii) Popular participation and access to forums for inclusive decision making: Other
researchers have focused on the demand side of democracy and argued that downward
accountability is helped by a strong and well-organised civil society (Grindle, 2007;
Cabrero, 2007; Putnam, 1993; Bowles and Gintis, 2002, Andersson and van Laerhoven,
2007). Organised citizen groups (NGOs, unions, associations of small and medium-sized
entrepreneurs, among others) should be in a position to engage in partnerships with
government and to monitor local officials and hold them accountable. This places
agency in the citizens and their ability to organise and interact with the formal political
structure, but it calls for legal dispositions that give a role to these associations (regional
development agencies or municipal councils for instance) in the development of the
territory. This perspective seems particularly important in Latin America, with its strong
corporatist traditions, powerful executives, and historically stronger upward, rather
than downward, accountability mechanisms. The existence of a participatory decision-
making forum can make a big difference for strengthening democracy at the local level.
The main purpose of such forums is to open up the decision-making process in the sub-
national government administration by inviting a broader range of stakeholders to take
part, including some social or economic groups that are normally not represented.
iii) Transparent decision making: For downward accountability to be possible, the local
decision-making process needs to be open and transparent. Ways of promoting
transparency include publishing information about decisions, actions and results of
publicly funded activities. Another is the organisation of open town hall meetings where
citizens have a chance to ask their elected officials questions about what the local
government has done or plans to do about issues of concern to citizens.
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that further decentralisation may entail a risk for the country’s current
economic and fiscal stability (mainly because of the lack of capacities of sub-
national units; the main arguments of the opponents of decentralisation in
Chile are provided in next section).
The literature and case studies abound with arguments for and against
decentralisation as a means of promoting economic growth, as shown in
Box 3.7 and as illustrated in Annex 3.A1. In spite of the empirical ambiguity,
existing research suggests that decentralisation outcomes are driven by a
number of interacting contextual factors: supportive local networks, national
and sub-national institutional frameworks, governance arrangements, and
types of decentralisation, among others (see Annex 3.A2). The importance of
each will vary according to the particular context. Yet, governance systems
with institutions of high quality and legitimate sub-national governments will
Box 3.7. Decentralisation and economic growth
Opposing theoretical views have provoked a great deal of interest in the
links between decentralisation and economic performance. However, the
many empirical studies conducted over the past two decades have not
significantly reduced the uncertainties associated with decentralisation and
its economic impacts. Economists who favour decentralisation often assume
that it leads to better resource allocation and a more productive, and possibly
smaller, public sector (Oates, 1972, 1999; Shah, 1998). Their logic is that locally
determined policies are better able to take account of local conditions for the
provision of public goods, such as infrastructure, health and education.
Others assume that decentralisation will produce healthy competition
among different levels of government, which in turn will promote lower tax
rates and the efficient delivery of public goods and services (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980). Yet others have argued that decentralisation may also give
local governments incentives to innovate in the production and supply of
public goods and services (Vasquez and McNab, 2003, cited in Thornton, 2007).
Some theories point out that the arguments that link decentralisation and
economic growth are often based on the assumption that the decentralised
units have sufficient institutional skills to carry out the delegated
responsibilities, but that this is not always the case. These theories do not
reject the potential benefits of decentralisation, but focus on the capacities of
sub-national governments to execute the devolved responsibilities. In this
regard, some research reveals the potential reinforcement of territorial
disparities as a result of decentralisation owing to pre-existing inequalities,
especially when decentralisation is not accompanied by allocation of funds
and institutional and technical support to match the new responsibilities
(Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004).
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be in a good position to improve administrative and economic efficiency
through decentralisation. 
The challenge for central governments seeking to improve decentralisation
outcomes is to work towards achieving a governance structure capable of
context-sensitive interventions that respond to local particularities in terms
of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and problems. As mentioned, some
measures taken by the Chilean government go in this direction, such as the
devolution of responsibilities for regional planning to the regional governments
and the democratic election of the regional council. However, there is a need to go
further in developing an adequate governance framework capable of overcoming
the current fiscal and administrative limitations on sub-national governments
underlined above. The next section reviews areas that could make a difference in
the effectiveness of the decentralisation reforms in Chile, within the context of a
shift towards a territorial approach to development.
3.2. Making decentralisation reforms work
While there is no ideal degree of decentralisation, ways to make it work
in establishing a territorial approach to development can be recommended.
Experience shows that decentralisation has to be tailored to a country’s
institutional history, structure and culture. With a focus on Chile’s specific
governance characteristics and political context, several issues might be
addressed to ensure the efficiency of the current decentralisation reforms in
improving public support to regional development:
● The scope for reform and implementation. Identification of the constraints,
the feasibility and scope of decentralisation is a key to success.
● A judicious reallocation of responsibilities. Targets in terms of the reallocation
of responsibilities must be well defined as must the means for reaching them.
Box 3.7. Decentralisation and economic growth (cont.)
Economists who are more sceptical about the economic benefits of
decentralisation argue that it creates many difficulties for managing
macroeconomic policy, especially in terms of ensuring fiscal co-ordination
and implementing stabilisation policies (e.g. Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996).
More specifically, several studies question the desirability of transferring
responsibility for revenue and expenditure functions to local levels because a
tax assigned to local governments might be more efficiently managed
centrally. A second worry is that sub-national governments would have an
incentive to spend excessively on public consumption rather than on public
investment, which would lead to suboptimal levels of expenditure.
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● Arrangements for co-ordination. Regionally based policies require a certain
degree of decentralisation, which also requires developing a solid
institutional framework for co-ordination and specific arrangements
among the various sectoral actors and the different levels of government.
● Capacity building at sub-national level. Sub-national skills and
institutional strengths are crucial to guarantee that decentralised units will
have the capacity to act autonomously and efficiently.
● Citizen participation: There is strong evidence that the extent to which
decentralisation will improve public service outcomes depends on the
creation of institutions for participation and accountability.
The scope for reform and implementation
The political economy of reform is essential to the viability of the reform.
It is important to identify and react to the challenges policy makers encounter
when designing and implementing reforms. One common reason for the lack
of success is insufficient attention to the groups that resist change, the
reasons for their resistance, and the mechanisms for managing and reducing
or removing this resistance. As a first condition of any political reform, it is
necessary to see clearly both the resistance to and the support for the reform.
Once this is established, the path of the reform can be set, the role of the
different actors can be defined, and the arrangements among them and their
responsibilities under the new governance framework can be established.
Resistance to change in Chile
Chile’s proposed decentralisation reforms have received mixed reactions
from actors within the society. Even within the central government there is a
broad spectrum of opinions regarding the decentralisation process.
Decentralisation sceptics rely on four main arguments:
● Sub-national actors’ lack of capacity to handle the new governance
responsibilities. Because of Chile’s long history of centralisation, sub-
national officials tend to have less formal education and training than their
national counterparts. At the same time, regional and municipal
governments might lack the institutional capacities to deal with public
policies as efficiently as their national counterparts. For this reason, some
critics argue that sub-national units would lack the capabilities to assume
further responsibilities.
● Threats to fiscal discipline. Opponents to the reform argue that
decentralisation may destabilise Chile’s public finance system by effectively
relaxing the principles of fiscal discipline. These principles, the argument
goes, can only be preserved if the central government, and the Ministry of
Finance in particular, retains full control over the country’s public finances.
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This position is based on the view that if sub-national governments are
allowed to define some of their tax rates in order to finance locally provided
public services, they may impose inefficient tax rates that result in
underfinancing public investments. Along the same lines, if they are
allowed to take out loans to finance public investments, they might default
on their loan payments, with implications for a balanced national budget at
the aggregate level. These fears, have taken proposals for fiscal
decentralisation off the current policy agenda of the central government.
● Jeopardy of economic growth. Related to the two former assumptions there
is some concern among some central government officials that any change
to the current system, which has brought about considerable economic
growth and political stability, would put these achievements at risk.
Advocates of this position often refer to the inferior economic and political
performance of neighbouring countries that have pursued more aggressive
decentralisation reforms and use this as evidence in support of their
argument that Chile ought to stick to its centralised model of public policy.
Such an argument fails, however, to consider the possibility that the current
system underperforms in terms of efficient and effective responses to local
needs, concerns and opportunities.
● Insufficient local democracy. Some opponents of decentralisation fear that
further devolution to sub-national governments could leave local public
affairs in the hands of local and regional oligarchies. If political and
economic elites control the decision making, decentralisation might
exacerbate existing asymmetries in both politics and economics. Such an
outcome would be bad for democracy and equality, two of the central
government’s priority policy objectives. While there is some evidence that
local elites continue to exert some influence over local political affairs in
some Chilean localities, there is no proof that this has had an effect on
equality and even less on democracy at the local level. On the contrary,
a 2004 survey (Mas Voces, 2005) found that municipal governments
represent one of the three main organisations (after the family and
neighbourhood organisations) to which Chileans turn for help in solving the
problems that they are most concerned about. This high level of perceived
legitimacy of the local government bodes well for downward accountability
in Chile.
Some local government representatives have also expressed concerns
about the likely effects of decentralisation. In particular, they may fear that
the reforms are likely to lead to more responsibilities at local levels without
the necessary funds and decision-making power to handle these new
governance responsibilities. An unfunded mandate, they argue, may further
complicate local government affairs.
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The expression of these opinions about decentralisation is not a sign of
the weakness of the Chilean policy reform process. On the contrary, the
ongoing debate is healthy because the resistance forces reformers to make a
clear and convincing case for reform. It also challenges the reformers to take
on the arguments against decentralisation reforms and demonstrate how the
government proposes to avoid the potential risks associated with it.
Initiating the reform
Resistance to change makes it crucial to identify tools for removing
barriers. Every reform or transition process has inherent obstacles. Resistance
comes particularly from fears about unexpected outcomes. Other possible
obstacles are linked to resistance to the engagement of new stakeholders in
decision making and in defining strategies. Reform is also resisted by social
groups or administrative officials that fear the loss of acquired rights. The
evidence from some OECD countries reveals several means of facilitating
reforms. These were outlined at the Global Forum on Governance held in Rio de
Janeiro in October 2007 (OECD, 2008b) and may provide a useful reference for
Chile (see Box 3.8). 
In Chile, the main resistance to giving more relevance to sub-national
actors seems to be a fear of jeopardising the macroeconomic stability achieved
during the last decades. This requires an effort to better communicate the
expected outcomes of the move towards place-based policies, with special
emphasis on the potential medium- and long-term efficiency gains to be
obtained from this reform in terms of the productivity and competitiveness
potential of the different regions and of the country as a whole. In particular,
there is a need to show that the benefits of reform outweigh its costs and that
the results, in terms of growth and welfare, are greater than under the previous
policy. This requires assessing the impact of the “new” regional policy.
A judicious reallocation of responsibilities
Establishing the roles
The responsibilities of the different levels of government must be clearly
presented. In Chile, the laws that define the responsibilities of regional and
local governments are the organic constitutional law of municipalities
(LOCMUN) and the organic constitutional law of regional government and
administration (LOCGAR), respectively. They establish the main functions of
regional and local governments (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Yet, as of now, as
in many OECD countries, concurrent responsibilities across Chile’s different
levels of government create ambiguity. This is the case, among others, of the
responsibility for productive development. Even if this is an area for which
both municipalities and regions have delegated responsibilities, national
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Box 3.8. Measures used in OECD countries to enable reforms
Building positive expectations for the outcomes of decentralisation reforms among
different national and sub-national stakeholders is both a challenge and an
opportunity. It is essential to communicate the objectives and expected outcomes of
the reform process in a clear manner, with special emphasis on the search for
efficiency, and to allow the different stakeholders to participate. For example, the speed
of the Danish reform of local government depended on the ability to convince different
stakeholders that changes would improve service quality.
Building trust and co-operation among levels of government is important for
effective multi-level governance, as is identifying with whom or where final decision-
making power lies. Building trust is fundamental when wishing to move past the status
quo during transitional periods. One means to accomplish this is to discuss and work
out among the different actors a set of rules and agreements regarding the path of
change. This national political consensus was crucial during the transition to
democracy in Spain: an extended dialogue was promoted among the different political
parties and between the central government and the regions (all of them with different
positions on decentralisation) about the objectives and scope of the process.
Additionally, a line of responsibility among the different levels of government was
included in the 1978 constitution which identifies where final decision-making power
rests. The constitution was elaborated by representatives of the main political parties.
It received popular legitimacy through a referendum in which citizens gave it their
strong support. Co-operation can also be important for balancing outcomes for reform
“winners” and “losers”. When shifting from the old to the new fiscal equalisation
system, Switzerland established a temporary cohesion fund so that no poor canton
would be a net loser in the first years of the change. Additionally, wealthy cantons,
which bore the costs of the new equalisation system, were compensated by increased
spending power (a shift from earmarked to general-purpose non-earmarked grants).
Capacity building. Investing in capacity building can assuage the fears of national
officials about sub-national governments’ lack of skills and experience to execute the
devolved responsibilities or to participate in multi-level government agreements. As
capacity building requires a certain amount of “learning by doing” it may be that sub-
national governments need to have responsibilities transferred to them in order to
undergo this learning process.
Performance measurement can also play an important role in a decentralisation
environment. Indicator systems can reduce information asymmetries between central
and sub-central actors, help the central government transfer knowledge across sub-
central authorities, contribute to monitoring a decentralisation process, reveal sub-
national capacities, and encourage performance improvements at sub-central level. In
addition, they can provide information for assessing the progress and impact of
decentralisation and other reforms.
Source: OECD (2008b).
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ministries and national public agencies also play a key role. This makes it
especially important to define clearly the role and responsibilities of each level
of government: vaguely defined coexisting mandates may compromise the
implementation of key services.
To reach a national agreement regarding the scope of decentralisation
will be crucial. Targets in terms of the reallocation of responsibilities must be
clear as must the path and means to reach them. This requires a clear
presentation of the responsibilities of the different levels of government. At
the same time, to ensure service delivery, decentralisation should be
implemented along with administrative and financial arrangements that
enable the execution of the devolved competences.
Establishing a governance structure adapted to place-based policies
As noted, the reforms and moves towards a territorial approach in Chile
suffer from the administrative and financial limitations on sub-national
governments. A main challenge is to develop a governance structure capable of
context-sensitive interventions that respond to local particularities in terms of
strengths, opportunities and challenges. OECD countries have made a wide
variety of decentralisation choices and have adopted different institutional
arrangements to govern the relationships between levels of government. The
administrative structure in different countries is the result of their specific
history and the institutional arrangements adopted with a view to efficient
public management, yet the degree of autonomy transferred to sub-national
entities normally requires a balance between at least two forces:
● Proximity helps to understand and adapt the response to specific local
demands/opportunities. This pleads for giving powers of decision to lower
levels of government, which are closer to citizens.
● Retaining control at the central level helps to reach national goals and
ensure territorial coherence.
The balance struck between these opposing forces depends on the nature
of each service and the specific characteristics of each country. It is not always
easy to find a good balance. This is very evident in Chile, where recent
decisions to delegate regional responsibilities to regional bodies have been
affected by the control that national units still exercise with a view to national
efficiency and coherence. In spite of notable differences in their governance
structures, most OECD countries try to combine the aims of achieving national
policy goals and of ensuring national coherence with sufficient autonomy for
sub-national units so that regions can improve their competitiveness. In this
regard, a common element is the re-emergence of a territorial policy
approach. Countries have recognised both the need for comprehensive
regional approaches in order to generate growth and competitiveness in their
3. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY DELIVERY
OECD TERRITORIAL REVIEWS: CHILE – ISBN 978-92-64-06074-6 – © OECD 2009 189
regions and the crucial interdependencies between regional development and
national growth and cohesion (OECD, 2007a).
Regional competitiveness requires context-sensitive responses which in
turn require a certain degree of decentralisation. Regionalisation of national
policies is not enough; some decentralisation is also necessary. Specific place-
based strategies can exploit local opportunities in a way that is consistent with
the strengths and weaknesses of regions. In some countries, the centralisation
of regional policy or hierarchical control over its implementation is considered
a good way to ensure consistency but it risks losing sight of regional and local
strengths and opportunities. As underlined in Chapter 2, this is the case in
Chile, where, despite recent progress, the agenda for territorial development,
largely designed at the national level, undermines the capacity to further
exploit regional opportunities. The search for regional competitiveness must
be supported by the identification of regional opportunities to be exploited.
For this, the role of the regional government in Chile should be further
strengthened.
Strengthening the regional institutional framework
Moving towards an integrated territorial approach in Chile will require
evolving towards a solid and enhanced governance structure at the regional
level that is able to generate a coherent framework for economic development.
This presents several challenges. On the one hand, the role of the regional
development strategies of the regional government, as a guiding framework
for investments in the regions, should be reinforced. Regional governments
are responsible for designing regional development strategies and
establishing the main socio-economic guidelines for regional development for
a period of six to ten years. Yet in terms of investments, neither the intendant
nor the different public actors that present initiatives, or that intervene in the
investment process, are required to follow the guidelines set in the regional
development strategies or in the regional agendas of the RDAs. This creates a
disincentive for regional planning. Additionally, as observed in Chapter 2, the
agenda for regional economic development remains largely determined by the
national agenda. The articulation of regional strategies with national
guidelines and priorities is obviously important. But the mapping of key areas
for regional development would be improved by seeking specifically regional
vocations and regional synergies. Institutionally reinforced regional
development strategies, linked to the national investment process, would be
necessary to give the regional government and the new planning division the
opportunity to play a greater role in guiding regional development in a
comprehensive way. This would require adapting the investment process to a
territorial logic that makes it possible to finance integrated, multi-sectoral
initiatives and to a multi-annual budgeting/planning framework for
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implementing local/regional policy. A multi-annual budget would allow for
better management of investment projects. It would also help policy makers
to see more clearly the longer-term consequences of their spending decisions.
There is a need to increase the institutional support to regional
governments and to give them greater powers so that they can become active
players in the discussion, planning and co-ordination of regional development
policies. In recent years a special effort has been made to devolve
responsibilities to regional governments (including for regional planning).
However, in any decentralisation process, the assignment of new
responsibilities requires new governance arrangements and an appropriate
allocation of responsibilities and the legal mandate to carry them out. In this
regard, national institutions and agencies, especially the regional
representatives of national public services and line ministries, should reinforce
their links and co-ordination with regional governments. Institutionalised
channels of communication should be strengthened. This will be crucial for
giving regional governments the elements and capacity to carry out their
enlarged mandate (especially their responsibilities for regional planning)
efficiently. At the same time, there is a need for greater co-ordination between
the regional bodies dealing with territorial issues, mainly the regional
government and the regional development agencies. Attention should be paid
to clarifying the responsibilities and strengthening the interaction mechanisms
of these two institutions. These developments call for greater trust on the part
of the national institutions in the competences of regional institutions. It also
calls for greater co-operation between levels of government. Contracts, co-
ordination agreements and other mechanisms, such as capacity building and
performance indicators, could help in this process by raising regional
governments’ capacities and strengthening the legitimacy, coherence and
effectiveness of the reform.
Within this context the central government has a key role to play: greater
decentralisation does not mean that the central government should leave sub-
national governments alone. Central governments need to set the general
legal framework to enable virtuous relations, vertically among the different
levels of governments and horizontally among the different national sectoral
policies and among the different regions or municipalities. This legal
framework should target inter-regional disparities and should regulate fair
and effective fiscal relations among the different levels of government. Central
governments may help local governments carry out their new mandates by
offering technical support, co-ordinating the creation of economies of scale in
the production of some local public goods and services, and perhaps most
importantly in monitoring and evaluating the performance of sub-national
governments. A functional combination of the strengths of both national and
sub-national structures calls for multi-level governance arrangements.
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Co-ordination arrangements
Moving towards a comprehensive approach to regional development in
Chile will require developing a regulatory framework able to co-ordinate, on a
continuing basis, the efforts of the different actors and instruments involved
in economic development. As noted, a certain degree of decentralisation is
necessary, but decentralisation in itself does not ensure co-ordination and
policy coherence: several decentralised countries have severe co-ordination
problems at the regional level, with different regional secretaries and
programmes working with central agencies in an uncoordinated fashion
without a common integrated strategy.
There is a need for effective multi-level governance arrangements. A
crucial and not always easy task when implementing integrated policies is to
arrange good co-ordination and achieve coherence among the different levels of
government and among the different actors operating in the territory. As
mentioned, even in centralised countries many services require the
intervention of different levels of government (national, regional and local).
Interdependencies between levels of government also exist because individual
public actions at one level of government affect other levels of government.
Finally, the assignment of responsibilities to different levels of government also
requires multi-level governance arrangements for co-operation. However,
efforts to co-ordinate vertical ministerial organisations can sometimes face
resistance because they threaten sectoral interests and sectoral budget lines.
This could lead vertically organised ministries and secretaries to resist inter-
sectoral place-based approaches. Different measures and mechanisms can be
applied to promote co-ordination.
Co-ordination from the centre
More efforts are needed in Chile to strengthen the territorial orientation
of central government programmes. In addition to better co-ordination among
levels of government and to greater involvement of sub-national governments
in regional planning, it will be important for central policies on regional
development to have a territorial dimension. As noted in Chapter 2, there have
been a number of agreements to finance comprehensive economic
development initiatives with resources and support from several public
agencies (e.g. Chile Emprende), but these have been mostly ad hoc efforts. At
least three key conditions for promoting integrated territorial approaches to
regional policy at the central government level should be considered:
● A territorial development approach that promotes place-based rather than
one-size-fits-all policies at the central level should have high visibility/
priority on the political agenda.
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● Efficient administrative and fiscal mechanisms for inter-ministerial co-
ordination require procedures for financing multi-sectoral investments as
well as further encouragement of collaborative mechanisms among
different ministries and public agencies.
● The involvement of local actors (including local and regional governments
or regional development agencies) in the design and co-ordination of
national initiatives to be carried out in the regions would improve
information on regional requirements and regional synergies and help to
see how the initiative fits with other projects being carried out in the
territory.
Collaboration between ministries and public agencies should be
strengthened, as should the role of the Sub-secretariat for Regional and
Administrative Development (Subdere) as “arbiter” to facilitate and foster
integrated place-based approaches. In Chile, Subdere is the national unit in
charge of promoting regional development. It is under the Ministry of the
Interior and has a great degree of autonomy to deal directly with different
ministries on issues under its responsibility. Subdere focuses its activities on
four main areas: i) administration of public investment programmes
(especially regional allocation and oversight of resources linked to the FNDR
and the Municipal Common Fund (FCM); ii) design of decentralisation policies;
iii) analysis, monitoring and evaluation of the decentralisation process and
regional performance; and iv) support for institutional strengthening at the
sub-national level. Subdere also supports initiatives to incorporate a regional
vision in the activities of other central government institutions. However, it is
currently very difficult for Subdere, in practice, to act as the national co-
ordination unit. On the one hand, as pointed out in Chapter 2, public
investment going to the regions is regulated by the National Investment
System and is delivered on a sectoral basis. On the other, different initiatives
proposed by national ministries and public agencies normally follow a top-
down approach, sometimes without enough consultation and co-ordination
with Subdere.
Co-ordination and arbitration on regional development policy at the
central level is a challenge throughout OECD countries, but some options have
emerged. The spectrum of instruments ranges from bodies charged with co-
ordinating the activities of sectoral ministries, to ministries with broad
responsibilities and powers that encompass traditionally separate sectors
(see Box 3.9). 
The contractual approach
OECD countries use contracts as a useful way to improve the efficiency of
relations between levels of government, in contexts where public policies are
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co-produced by different levels of government. A contract is any arrangement
that reorganises the rights and duties of the different levels of government
other than by way of the Constitution. The contract establishes the set of norms
and “rules of the game” by which the parties commit themselves to follow a
mutually agreed mechanism (OECD, 2007a). These arrangements offer several
Box 3.9. Co-ordination of regional policy in OECD countries: 
various models
In OECD countries there are several different models for improving the co-
ordination of territorial policies at the national level. The simplest and most
common instrument is co-ordination through inter-ministerial committees
and commissions. Some co-ordinating structures are relatively informal,
others are more structured. Austria, for example, has developed an informal
approach that emphasises consensus building among ministries, while
Switzerland uses a more formal approach in which ministries dealing with
territorial development issues have to convene regularly in an inter-
ministerial body.
Several countries augment cross-sectoral co-ordination mechanisms
through special units or agencies that provide planning and advisory support
to help ensure policy coherence across sectors. In Norway, the Regional
Development Unit of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional
Development has responsibility for co-ordinating the regional dimension of
policies of other government departments, principally through inter-
ministerial groups. In the United Kingdom, the Regional Co-ordination Unit
– currently in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister – was set up to
implement cross-cutting initiatives and to advise departments. In Japan, the
National and Regional Planning Bureau in the Ministry of Land Infrastructure
and Transport has developed a new view of territorial/regional policy and
provided a network for local authorities as well as other local actors. In
France, the DIACT (Délégation interministerielle à l’amenagement et la
compétititvité des territories) is an inter-ministerial body directly linked to
the Office of the Prime Minister (it co-ordinates national territorial policy and
handles planning contracts and the European structural funds) and receives
information from the different ministries regarding their regional priorities
and the strategic objectives identified by the regional prefects.
These co-ordination bodies also function as the interface with regional
governments in the area of economic development – allocating funding,
setting the guidelines for drawing up regional strategies, advising on and
authorising the strategies, and ensuring value for money.
Source: OECD (2005), Building Competitive Regions.
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advantages for regional development policies: they allow for customised
management of interdependencies; they are useful tools for dialogue that can
be used for clarifying responsibilities and making mutual commitments
explicit; they open possibilities for judicial enforcement; and they can be used
as learning mechanisms. Contracts are used both in unitary and federal states.
In some unitary states, contracts are often used in the framework of
decentralisation as a way to complement (or implement) the constitutional
delegation of authority. Yet, to enter into a contract the parties need to have
certain level of autonomy.
Contracts are tools that can be used to explore new governance
mechanisms, to transmit skills and to clarify responsibilities among the
different levels of government. In some cases, successful contracting
arrangements can lead to constitutional reforms if both parties have clarified or
discovered a good assignment of responsibilities and good co-ordination rules
between them. Alternatively, a successful contract between levels of
government can lead to its replication in similar relationships between other
parties or between the same parties but on another topic. Because of their
capacity to be adapted to specific contexts and promote shared objectives and
references (especially when accompanied by indicator systems) contracts might
be considered a possible tool for reforming traditional practices in the
governance of public policies in Chile, in particular for regional development.
They would solve various kinds of issues: a framework for multi-level
co-ordination, a tool for learning and capacity building, identification of
relevant projects for competitiveness at the regional level, territorial
customisation of competitiveness policy.
In Chile, programming agreements (acuerdos de programación) are a main
tool for co-ordinating regional and sectoral priorities through multi-level
agreements (see Box 3.10). A main advantage is that these investment
initiatives allow multi-year budgeting. At the same time, they allow the
regional government to take an important role in the design of these projects
(integrating them in the framework of the regional development strategy).
However, to date, the use of programming agreements has been mainly
restricted to large infrastructure initiatives. Moreover, a common complaint is
that the initiative and leading role in these agreements come largely from the
line ministries, which use the system to carry out projects that would have
been implemented anyway, with the added advantage that under this scheme
the expenses are shared. As a result, the projects mostly reflect the priorities
of the line ministries (Ministerio del Interior, 2001). An enforced and clarified
role for regional governments and more institutionalised co-ordination
between them, the line ministries and public agencies would be necessary to
move the programming agreement format beyond large infrastructure
initiatives to other areas, projects or parties. Within this expanded contract
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setting a shared assessment could be established in order to disseminate the
“lessons learned”.
Local government co-ordination in metropolitan areas
Co-ordination is essential to efficient service provision in any
metropolitan area. This is a common challenge in most OECD countries, both
because several public institutions are involved in the regulation, provision
and oversight of public services, and because functional metropolitan areas
normally integrate several municipalities. In Chile, as noted in Chapter 2,
urban planning is a significant challenge, particularly in Valparaíso,
Concepción and in metropolitan Santiago, where the fragmentation of the
functional city into different municipalities affects the overall co-ordination
and management of urban public services, such as public transport. Greater
Santiago is composed of 35 autonomous municipalities. There is no single
municipal authority with jurisdiction over the entire city. The provision of
local public services is normally a task for national institutions: national
Box 3.10. Programming agreements in Chile
A programming agreement is a formal agreement between one or more
regional governments and one or more ministries, detailing measures and
procedures to be undertaken in projects of common interest over a specified
period of time. These agreements can also integrate other public or private
national, regional or local institutions. It allows for carrying out multi-
annual projects of one to five years. For the resources to be made available
the agreements have to respect the following stages: i) formulation of the
Idea: to identify projects that address regional problems effectively in the
context of the region’s development strategy; ii) the signing of a protocol of
purpose which initiates negotiations with the ministries; iii) deciding on
projects and programmes: project decision making, pre-investment studies
if they do not exist, technical units for the investigation’s monitoring and
results; iv) drafting the programming agreement: defining rights and
responsibilities of the parties involved; and v) presentation of the
agreement to the Regional Council, its approval and signing. Projects are
carried out using the resources of both line ministries and regional
governments (FNDR resources). On average, regional governments
contribute 33% of the resources and line ministries make up the remaining
66%. The bulk of the projects are carried out with three line ministries:
public works, housing and health. They are mostly designed to implement
large Infrastructure projects.
Source: Subdere.
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ministries (for instance, the Ministry of Transport deals with Santiago’s urban
transport system), regional directorships of national ministries (e.g. the
Housing and Urban Development Department – SERVIU), or public agencies
(e.g. the National Commission for Environment – CONAMA). Additionally, each
municipality has exclusive responsibility for enforcing all measures regarding
transport, for implementing provisions regarding construction and city
planning, and for the planning and urban regulation of the municipality.
Municipalities also share responsibilities for social housing. Within this
disaggregated context, the areas of responsibility of the different authorities
are not clearly defined (Dockemdorff, Rodríguez and Winchester, 2000). It is
thus essential to establish the role and line of responsibilities of each
institution.
A co-ordinated local governance structure is required in big cities like
Santiago. This is especially necessary for ensuring that different sectoral
policies implemented in the metropolitan area are correctly integrated;
different municipal areas (e.g. housing, land use planning and economic
development) are connected to the urban economy and require cross-sectoral
coherence. In parallel, co-ordination of the delivery of public services across
several municipalities within a metropolitan area (for instance, public
transport) also calls for establishing a metropolitan governance system.
It would be good to start discussions on the establishment of a local
planning institution able to deal with the challenges affecting big urban
conurbations formed by several municipalities. Such an authority would have
better information and the capacity to deal with the complex challenges of
delivering public services in the greater Santiago area. OECD countries use
different institutional designs to improve co-ordination in the delivery of
public services in urban areas in which the functional area is larger than the
administrative boundaries (see Box 3.11). 
In Chile, as a result of the establishment of the integrated public transport
system for the city of Santiago, Transantiago (see Chapter 2), attempts were
made to establish a metropolitan co-ordination unit: the “co-ordinación general
del transporte de Santiago” and the “directorio de transporte de Santiago”. However
these institutions were formed almost exclusively with central government
institutions (different ministries and under-ministries), without any
representation of local government on the institution’s board. At the same
time these units had only a consultative role. Several cities in OECD countries
opt for a single metropolitan institution or authority to co-ordinate the main
urban issues, such as urban transport. Representatives of the main local
parties give this authority better information, planning and negotiation
capacity. The regional transport authorities of Chicago and Frankfurt offer
useful examples (see Box 3.12).
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Finally, the specific structure and the mandate of a urban planning
institution for Santiago (either a global urban planning unit or a specific
transport authority) would be key factors in its success. An efficient urban
co-ordination unit would need to have the necessary authority (established
either through a specific contract or by law) that would clearly define its
tasks, responsibilities, mandate and mode of interaction with the different
sectoral institutions, the regional government and individual municipalities.
In addition, such a unit should represent the main public parties but it
should also be able to carry out its tasks efficiently. The large number of
municipalities that comprise greater Santiago and the variety of public
actors involved in the delivery of urban public services in Chile makes this a
challenge. To tackle this challenge, some transport planning institutions
established in OECD countries have decided to reduce the direct
representation of municipal public officials on the institution’s board and
appoint professionals with expertise in areas relevant to the institution’s
role. The Vancouver transport authority offers an example (see Box 3.13). 
Box 3.11. Types of metropolitan governance in OECD countries
Many cities have placed greater emphasis on voluntary instruments for co-
ordination and co-operation. The discussion of how to manage metropolitan
areas better revolves principally around a spectrum of models that range
from relatively “heavy” to relatively “light” in terms of the scope of the
reform they imply.
i) At the relatively heavy end are functional models whereby governance
structures are reshaped to fit or to approximate the functional economic
area of the metropolitan area. Examples include the creation of a
metropolitan government and the amalgamation of municipalities.
ii) At mid-position are a wide range of co-operative arrangements through
inter-municipal joint authorities, most often on a voluntary basis, such
as sectoral or multi-sectoral agencies whose main functions generally
include transport, urban planning or economic development
(sometimes on ad hoc basis).
iii) At the light end are informal co-ordination bodies such as platforms,
associations or strategic planning partnerships, often relying on existing
networks of relevant actors, without necessarily following the logic of
territorial boundaries.
Source: OECD (2006). 
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Box 3.12. Transport authorities in Chicago and Frankfurt
The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) operates as the second-largest public
transportation system in North America, providing financial oversight and regional
planning for the three public transit operators in north-eastern Illinois: the Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA), Metra commuter rail and Pace suburban bus. Created in 1974 as a special-
purpose unit of local government and a municipal corporation of the state of Illinois, it
provides more than 2 million rides daily and oversees assets valued at more than USD
27 billion. The origins of RTA can be traced to 1974, when residents of six counties in north-
eastern Illinois – Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will – approved its creation in
a referendum.
In terms of governance, the RTA’s Board of Directors provides oversight responsibility and
approves an annual budget and two-year financial plan. The 16-member RTA Board consists
of 15 directors who are appointed from within the six-county region: five directors by the
Mayor of the City of Chicago; four directors by the suburban members of the Cook County
Board; one director by the President of the Cook County Board (from Suburban Cook County);
and one director each from DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will counties, who are
appointed by the chair of their respective county board. The chair, its 16th member, is
elected by at least 12 of the 16 appointed members. The RTA Board is required annually to
review and approve a five-year capital plan, which is a blueprint for the capital activities to
be funded by the RTA and executed by the CTA, Metra and Pace. The levels of service, fares
and operational policies are left to the discretion of the respective boards of the CTA, Metra
and Pace. Currently the RTA conducts regional mobility analysis, enforces paratransit
guidelines, researches intelligent transportation systems (ITS), and administers a regional
discounted fare programme for senior citizens and the disabled.
The Frankfurt Rhein Main transport authority (RMV) organises public transport in the area
of Rhein Main, which comprises two-thirds of the state of Hessen. RMV also co-ordinates the
regional public transport system in close co-operation with the local transport
organisations. Decisions about transport facilities and tariffs are made at the political level,
and the RMV and the local transport organisations implement these decisions. Transport
enterprises such as the national railways or bus enterprises are answerable to the RMV
through performance contracts. The 130 enterprises within the territory of the RMV are
allowed independence in carrying out their contracts and achieving the required
performance levels. Although the RMV does not have its own rail network or materials, it
can plan for the construction of new rail networks, stations and material. One of the
priorities when the RMV was first created in 1995 was to harmonise about 100 tariff systems
that existed in the area it covered. It created one universal tariff and a single ticket that can
be used on all the means of public transport, no matter how many transfers are made. The
price is set depending on the number of tariff areas crossed. Every December, the schedules
of regional transport in the RMV area are adjusted. The RMV informs the public about any
changes in the 14 local transport systems and the one regional transport system.
Source: OECD Territorial Reviews, Cape Town, South Africa (2008).
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Box 3.13. Transport authorities: Vancouver’s TransLink
TransLink is the organisation responsible for the regional transport network of Metro
Vancouver in British Columbia, Canada, including public transport and major roads and
bridges. TransLink was created in 1998 (then called the Greater Vancouver Transportation
Authority, or GVTA) and fully implemented in April 1999 by the Government of British
Columbia to replace BC Transit in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (now Metro
Vancouver) and assume many transport responsibilities previously held by the provincial
government. TransLink is responsible for various modes of transport such as bus, rail and
ferry services in the Metro Vancouver region, covering 21 municipalities (2 077 square
kilometres) and serving more than 2 million people. Some of its operations extend into the
Fraser Valley Regional District (FVRD). On 29 November 2007, the province of British
Columbia approved legislation changing the governance structure and name of the
organisation. With the new governance model, TransLink will be looking to expand its
services beyond Metro Vancouver, potentially reaching as far north as Pemberton and as
far east as Hope, based on municipal agreements. This is to meet the transport needs of
the rapidly growing population of Metro Vancouver and its surrounding region.
In place of elected officials, the TransLink Board is now comprised of 11 appointed
professionals, with expertise in areas relevant to the management of TransLink, such as
finance, transport and labour relations. The Board is appointed by the Council of Mayors
and is responsible for hiring and monitoring the performance of the CEO, and providing
oversight of TransLink’s strategic planning. The Council of Mayors is composed of the
mayors of the 21 municipalities within Metro Vancouver. Under the previous structure,
fewer than half of the municipalities of the GVRD were represented on the TransLink. In
addition, an independent Regional Transportation Board has been nominated to deal with
fare increases above inflation, TransLink’s plans for annual satisfaction surveys, its
customer complaint process and any proposed sale of major assets. Most importantly, the
Commissioner reports to the Council of Mayors on TransLink’s performance. Under the
previous revenue scheme, TransLink relied heavily on property taxes for funding. The new
legislation leaves TransLink with its previous major funding sources (transit fares,
property taxes and a share of the provincial tax on gasoline sold in the Metro Vancouver
area), which fund the billion-dollar operation and the CAD 4 billion capital plan. In
addition, TransLink will also continue to benefit from Federal Gas Tax Fund. The parking
stall tax, worth approximately CAD 18 million annually, has been replaced with an equal
amount of property tax.
The new legislation gives TransLink access to an additional three cents of gas revenues
in Metro Vancouver (worth approximately CAD 66 million) if, by the end of the new ten-
year strategic plan, TransLink can demonstrate that it can raise CAD 130 million from
regional sources such as increases in property tax, transit fares and advertising revenues.
A new source of funding is revenues from property development near rapid-transit
stations, illustrating TransLink’s new role as a real estate development body.
Source: Vancouver’s Translink website.
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Capacity building and reform at sub-national level
In Chile, there is a widespread perception that the current levels of
governance capacity in local governments – both municipal and regional
governments – are insufficient for performing their mandated tasks in a
satisfactory manner. Sub-national government staff generally tend to have
less formal training than civil servants at the central level. Lack of capacity in
Chile’s sub-national governments is linked to the relatively limited financial
resources of most regional and municipal governments for hiring qualified
staff. Central government agencies offer much higher wages and are thus able
to attract the most highly trained personnel (Valenzuela, 2006).
Sub-national governments have advantages in terms of making use of
local knowledge, but the lack of human and institutional capacities can affect
their performance. Local knowledge, strong political incentives to respond to
local needs, and citizens’ ease of access to local officials all give sub-national
governments advantages for developing the institutional capacities needed
for local governance. Nevertheless, to reap the benefits of decentralisation it is
necessary to enforce the capacity of sub-national actors.
Investing in capacity building can facilitate the implementation of
decentralisation reforms in Chile and help to dispel one of the main fears of
opponents to these reforms. Some programmes have sought to improve the
skills of local and regional public officials in order to prepare them to carry out
their devolved responsibilities efficiently. This is the case of Subdere’s
Governance Improvement Programme (Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión
de Subdere), which seeks to strengthen territorial development processes by
providing technical and administrative support to local actors who are
receiving an expanded public policy mandate as a result of decentralisation.
Regional governments are the main target group. Subdere staff interacts with
the regional government staff to document and assess practices and
procedures in each of the 15 regional governments. The participatory
monitoring and evaluation system identifies limitations and potential
opportunities for augmenting capacities and addressing shortcomings
through a process of progressive administrative adjustments and training. An
attractive feature of the programme is that it has shifted the focus from the
central government’s pure control function to a focus more in line with its
facilitative role in an increasingly decentralised context.
This is in line with reforms implemented in the OECD area, where
capacity building is a responsibility that normally involves sub-national
governments and other actors: sub-national governments are called upon to
help recognise needs and design the necessary programmes. Involvement of
regional academic institutions and NGOs in these programmes is frequent and
could be an interesting option for capacity-building programmes in Chile.
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Another specific measure to improve public officials’ capacities in OECD
countries is promotion of staff mobility both nationally, between central and
local governments, and between the public and private sectors. This allows
sharing expertise and best practices and focusing employee development on
strategic needs (see the example of Interchange Canada in Box 3.14).
In Chile, the lack of flexibility to adapt the organisational structure of
municipalities to local characteristics and demands has also hindered
capacity building at the local level. As of now, several measures related to
human resource management at the municipal level, such as the composition
of the technical and professional staff or the maximum share of municipal
resources devoted to hiring municipal staff, remain fixed and tied by national
organic laws. The municipal reform under way is intended to give
municipalities more responsibility and flexibility in the administration of
human resources. It also aims to make performance incentives part of the
remuneration of local officials. At the same time the reform is intended to
offer municipalities further support and to improve municipal fiscal revenues,
among other measures. This would be a necessary step in giving localities
greater autonomy to adapt their organisational characteristics to their
particular needs and create an institutional framework more favourable to
improving the capacities of local governments.
Learning by doing
In centralised countries like Chile, constraining the political mandate of
sub-national units can stifle local possibilities and motivation to acquire new
skills. Reformers seeking to improve public-sector performance by
decentralising governance responsibilities face a dilemma. While the
devolution of political autonomy to local governments seems necessary to
start a process of progressive capacity building, such devolution may seem
risky if the local governance actors do not appear capable of performing the
tasks asked of them. The solution is often a very limited transfer of political
autonomy and resources combined with a more “generous” transfer of
responsibilities. The problem is that, as noted above, a process that limits the
resources and tools to carry out devolved responsibilities will restrict the
capacity to execute these responsibilities efficiently.
Capacity building requires learning by doing. Moreover, observations
from OECD countries reveal that apart from mechanisms to strengthen
performance and improve local officials’ skills, building capacity clearly
benefits from the progressive involvement of sub-national governments in
public affairs (see the example of Sweden in Box 3.15). Most countries have
implemented this learning by doing framework gradually, by offering
technical assistance and capacity building parallel to a progressive transfer of
responsibilities. The use of performance indicators is a useful way to be aware
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Box 3.14. Interchange Canada
Interchange Canada is a national programme that involves the temporary
assignment of employees from one sector to another, including the federal
public service, other levels of government, private-sector organisations,
academic institutions and non-profit organisations. These assignments serve
to strengthen policies, programmes and services, share expertise and best
practices, and encourage employee development in line with strategic
organisational needs.
Interchange Canada encourages employee assignments between the
federal public service and organisations in other sectors both within Canada
and internationally. By taking assignments in a new sector, employees
develop personally and professionally and their organisations benefit from
new skills, knowledge and approaches. Interchange Canada has the following
characteristics:
● Employees are sponsored by their organisation. During the assignment,
they work on site with the host organisation but remain employees of the
sponsoring organisation. At the end of the assignment, they are expected
to return to their sponsor. An assignment can be for a period of up to three
years.
● Employees maintain their current pay and benefits, and the sponsoring
organisation continues to pay the participant’s salary and benefits.
Normally, the host organisation reimburses the sponsor for these costs.
● The host pays for initial interview expenses as well as job-related travel
and training during the assignment.
Possible conflict of interest situations are examined. Participating
organisations are responsible for ensuring that there is no possible conflict of
interest or that the risk is not significant.
Interchange Canada is open to employees in all groups and at all levels of
the federal public service and to employees in business, other levels of
government, Crown corporations, unions, academic institutions and non-
profit organisations both within Canada and internationally.
Executives participating in the programme promote linkages between the
federal government and organisations in the private sector or other levels of
government, both within Canada and internationally. Because these leaders
influence an organisation at its highest levels, the knowledge, innovation and
cultural changes that result from their assignments are long-term and can
help enhance stakeholder relationships.
Source: ACOA; the Canada Public Service Agency; the Public Service Commission Advisory
Council of Canada.
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of institutional capacities and requirements and to monitor the process
(OECD, 2008b). The central government can adopt different general strategies
for transferring responsibilities in areas for which sub-national units have
limited management capacity. Either it can transfer policy domains
immediately to the sub-national authority and co-operate (on the basis of a
contract) to train and co-manage the delegated policy. Or, before delegating
wide policy areas to a weak sub-national government, it can narrow the scope
of delegation on the basis of a relatively detailed contract, the performance of
which can be the basis of further delegation (OECD, 2007a).
Matching devolved responsibilities and capabilities
A specific point to keep in mind is that capacities may be unequally
distributed across the country’s different territories. Some regions or localities
may find it more difficult than others, in human and institutional terms, to
cope with devolved responsibilities. In general terms, most developed
localities will be better able to adapt and benefit from further devolution,
while the least developed localities with weaker institutions and fewer
financial and human resources for carrying out the enlarged mandate, may
find implementation more difficult (Rodriguez Pose and Gill, 2004). This is an
important challenge in countries with marked territorial inequalities such as
Chile. Actions to provide less developed areas with appropriate means,
capacities and resources to execute an enlarged mandate will be crucial.
The perception of unequal capacities to carry out an extended mandate
has led some OECD countries to implement asymmetrical decentralisation,
with some localities in a transition period while they acquire the human,
social and institutional capacities to cope with the new responsibilities.
Decentralised functions and responsibilities should be commensurate with
the capacities of each sub-national unit and may be increased as capacities
become stronger. Asymmetric decentralisation in OECD countries has led to
some interesting experiences (see Sweden’s experience, described in
Box 3.15). This strategy could benefit countries with important territorial
disparities (like Chile), with responsibilities devolved gradually to
municipalities/regions with a minimum level of capacity. It could be piloted in
one region and gradually introduced elsewhere if the experience proves
successful. In Chile, the reform of the organic constitutional law of regional
government and administration (LOCGAR) which is under way proposes to
differentiate among “exclusive functions” and “transferable functions” of
regional governments. This reform will allow a transfer of responsibilities to a
single region or to a group of regions, as the result of specific requests by
either the regional government or a national ministry. 
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The use of incentives
Incentives that are tied to performance are an instrument for improving
capacities at sub-national level. In order to raise the performance of sub-
national units, countries can attach explicit rewards and sanctions to
indicators tied to specific performance objectives. Such incentives are usually
of two kinds: financial and administrative. Financial incentives refer to the
availability of funds based on performance. Administrative incentives are
changes to rules and regulations that affect regional or local actors, such as a
relaxation (or tightening) of budgetary rules, decreased (or increased)
oversight, etc. In Chile, the Management Improvement Programme (PMG)
offers public institutions a performance bonus (a financial incentive) based on
the fulfilment of several performance indicators. Another example may be the
Box 3.15. Asymmetrical decentralisation in Sweden
While homogeneous decentralisation processes facilitate management of
the whole system thanks to the application of the same set of rules and may
reinforce national cohesion, they may also be unable to adapt to different
territorial contexts. Therefore, in view of their political and cultural
characteristics or important differences in their ability to deliver and finance
services, local or regional governments may usefully be given different
responsibilities for transitory periods. Sweden has used asymmetrical
decentralisation to promote pilot experiences in particular regions. The
results of experimental regionalisation policies in the regions of Västra
Götland (three counties including the City of Göteborg) and Skåne (two
counties) since 1997 have been positive and led to the creation of regional
councils. These councils are in charge not only of traditional county council
tasks such as health care but also of the regional and economic development
programmes normally dealt with by the County Administrative Board. Later,
a new regional division of responsibilities was introduced: two regions with
directly elected political bodies (Skåne and Västra Götaland), one region with
an indirectly elected regional council (Kalmar) and one region in which a
municipality assumes regional functions (Gotland). The regions have taken
over certain tasks from the state, including responsibility for regional
development, support of businesses and decisions on investment in regional
infrastructure. The preliminary assessment of this decentralisation
experience by the Council of Europe in its local and regional report on
Sweden, adopted in June 2005, stresses the fact that “the region has
experienced an economic growth and capacity to administer a variety of
development programmes, from transport to health care, that would not
have happened if the trial had not taken place”.
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preferential scholar subsidy implemented by the Ministry of Education
from 2008. This reform involves the gradual transfer of resources and
management responsibilities to municipalities (as school operators)
conditional on results and the acquisition of capacity (see the section on
education in Chapter 2 for more details).
Performance indicators
In combination with incentive mechanisms, performance indicators can
contribute to capacity building. Indicators can be used both to measure and to
monitor the performance of the regional economy or to monitor and manage
the performance of regional policy actors. Multi-level governance can benefit
from the use of indicators. Indicators can reduce information asymmetries
between levels of government and are a way to share good practices, help the
central government transfer knowledge across sub-national authorities, and
encourage better performance. The use of performance indicators may
improve policy performance in several fields (OECD, 2008c):
● Select policy strategies: Information can reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of a regional economy and thus increase the likelihood that
policy objectives will be met.
● Monitor policy implementation: Once specific policies are implemented,
information from indicators can monitor input utilisation and the
achievement of milestones.
● Increase accountability: Information systems can enhance accountability
by offering information about the characteristics and results of what has
been done.
● Create knowledge and improve policy choices: Comparative performance
data may generate an implicit incentive by encouraging stakeholders to
improve their performance and efficiency and to search for better
strategies.
● Create a common framework for dialogue, by sharing common references
and objectives and contributing to a common learning process.
The effective implementation of performance indicators poses some
challenges. Information does not automatically improve policy performance.
It is important to select appropriate indicators and to validate and distribute
the information. At the same time, the capacity to use the information in an
effective and timely way has to be developed. Finally, weak local capacities can
limit the benefits of performance measurement and reduce the usefulness of
the system. This makes stakeholder training and the acquisition of the
necessary technologies at the local level especially important.
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Chile has implemented several performance management programmes
based on indicators, such as the Management Improvement Programme and
the Municipal Services Accreditation System. Subdere has also developed an
Internet platform with a complete system of municipal indicators, the SNIM
(see Box 3.16). Most performance indicator initiatives are designed top-down.
However Subdere developed the Municipal Services Accreditation System
together with the Chilean Association of Municipalities, in an effort to take
advantage of local knowledge to build the performance indicators. Such
intergovernmental participatory assessment could be extended to other
initiatives. The central authorities are well positioned to gather information
Box 3.16. Main performance indicator initiatives in Chile
The Management Improvement Programme (PMG) is a system for
ensuring the efficient allocation and use of public resources in the public
administration. The government adopted the concept of results-based
budgeting and gives a performance bonus to public institutions based on the
fulfilment of several performance indicators. A horizontal area under the
PMG is the Electronic Government System which is aimed at contributing to
the use of information and communication technologies through the
following actions: improve and simplify the information and services offered
by the state to the public; improve and simplify institutional support
processes; and promote the creation of technological channels that enable
enhanced transparency and community participation.
Subdere developed the Municipal Services Accreditation System together
with the Chilean Association of Municipalities and Chile Calidad (the National
Centre for Productivity and Quality). The system consists of a set of processes
and methods to support, guide and encourage municipalities to initiate and
remain on a continuous course of performance improvement. The certification
process is a multi-step process that starts when a municipality enrols
voluntarily in the programme. While the main goal of this voluntary
monitoring and evaluation programme is to certify governance processes that
meet high standards of quality control, it also provides essential decision
support to municipal actors in charge of public service provision.
The SINIM, the National System of Municipal Indicators, provides over
150 standardised indicators for each of the municipalities of the country. This
initiative of Subdere provides information that is easily accessible to the
general public through its website (www.sinim.cl/). The data make it possible
to compare the characteristics and performance of all Chilean municipalities,
and allow the different stakeholder to take informed decisions. The system
offers information from 2001 onward.
Source: Subdere.
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from many sources and facilitate its sharing among central and sub-central
authorities. However, an exclusively top-down approach to indicator selection
may fail to reflect regional and local needs and challenges. Moreover, a
strategy imposed by the centre in the absence of consultation may undermine
sub-national actors’ engagement and participation in the process. All of this
suggests that intergovernmental collaboration can be a good way to increase
the usefulness of indicator systems (OECD, 2008c). Participatory vertical and
horizontal arrangements can help make the system more effective. 
Enhancing participation
In Chile, as in many countries, decentralisation is largely seen as a way to
enable participation: it can enable the citizenry to be in a position to engage in
partnerships with government and to monitor and hold local officials
accountable. In fact, the empirical evidence reviewed above indicates that
participation can also be a tool for making decentralisation reforms work.
Governance systems with high quality institutions for downward
accountability and legitimate sub-national governments would be well placed
to improve administrative and economic efficiency through decentralisation.
Research has shown that effective public service delivery by local
governments depends on the degree to which they involve a variety of local
groups and individual citizens in political decision making, establish
transparent administrative processes, and are downwardly accountable and
responsive to broad local concerns of service users (Blair, 2000; Crook and
Manor, 1998; de Oliveira, 2002; Ribot, 2002; Singleton, 1998). In this regard,
OECD country experience shows that greater openness and participation in
policy making and service delivery can have several economic and political
advantages (OECD, 2008a):
● Better economic outcomes: Making policy in a more inclusive way can
contribute to better use of public funds by planning and implementing
policy options on the basis of more comprehensive knowledge from various
stakeholders (public, private, civil society). The co-operation, co-ordination
and involvement of the different actors in diverse instances (RDAs,
coalitions, participative councils) are an important aspect of the policy
process. Additionally, as noted in Chapter 2, active participation by regional
actors (local/regional governments, SMEs, universities, among others) may
help to reveal untapped regional resources that would not be identified by
traditional top-down approaches. This, in turn, would be important to
identify further possibilities for diversification.
● Innovative solutions: Engagement of the private sector and civil society
(including universities, community-based organisations and citizens in
general) is well known to be a driver of innovation in the public and
private sectors.
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● Increased legitimacy, trust in the reforms: Open and participative policy
making can reinforce credibility and legitimacy. Including different sectors
of society in the policy process can help them to understand the reforms,
increase social ownership of the process, and remove the barriers to reform.
Therefore, open and inclusive policy making (including the public and
private sectors, universities, community-based organisations and citizens in
general) contributes to better economic and political outcomes. Efforts to
strengthen democracy and the effectiveness of public services are mutually
reinforcing. By bringing policy decisions closer to citizens, decentralisation
can facilitate this process. However, there are various barriers to participation
in local government decision making.
Main barriers to participation and inclusiveness
Participation and accountability are not likely to result automatically from
decentralisation, and even when they do they may face a number of obstacles.
The notion that decentralisation somehow leads to increased participation is
often taken at face value: if governments are brought closer to the people, they
will seek citizens’ input when making decisions. Yet, in societies with
significant inequalities, inclusive local institutions for civic participation are
unlikely to emerge as a natural consequence of decentralisation.
In Chile, there are some initiatives under way to strengthen citizen
participation but even when participative forums exist, they may still not
reach most of the citizenry. The administrative organisation of municipalities
includes an economic and social council to represent the different social
groups and community-based organisations. The municipal government law
requires the preparation of the community development plans (PLADECO)
that include public participation. The programme for municipal strengthening
also encompasses several participation mechanisms, including personal
interviews with stakeholders and community focus groups. Additionally,
some public programmes and initiatives, such as the Rural Infrastructure for
Territorial Development (Box 1.2), take participation and empowerment of
local stakeholders as a basic characteristic. Yet, these initiatives have still not
reached most of the citizenry. A recent survey of a sample of 7 200 local
residents in Chilean municipalities (Más Voces, 2005) indicates that only 8% of
respondents had been invited to express their opinions on municipal decision
making. In addition, only 16% were aware of the existence of the Municipal
Council for Social and Economic Affairs. This survey showed that citizen
participation at the regional level is even more limited. Finally, 57% of those
surveyed said that the same group of (privileged) people is always invited to
participate by the government.
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This trend corresponds to OECD country experience that even when
participative forums exist, some sectors of society may be left out for
socioeconomic, ethnic, cultural or gender reasons. Even when inclusive
forums for participation (local councils for instance) are established, large
social inequalities or the marginalisation of certain groups mean that the
opinions of such groups will not be heard. Lack of interest in public policies
among those who can but do not wish to participate in public matters is
another barrier to participation in OECD countries. Local citizens may not
wish to participate if they believe that their voice will have little influence on
the final decision or if they have the perception that public authorities are
distant from citizens’ concerns. In societies where time is a limited resource,
people will not engage in participative activities if they feel that this will not
change their life. Lack of confidence in public authorities normally
accentuates this attitude. In Chile, 72% of respondents in the Mas Voces
survey (2005) considered that the best way to solve local problems is to have a
“good contact” in public institutions. Only 32% believed that a simple citizen
can influence the decisions taken by the government.
Measures to improve participation
Inclusive participation in decision making may require additional
measures to reach out to different social groups. Inclusive participation requires
something more than more tools for the organisations or citizens that already
have access to decision makers. Experience in OECD countries demonstrates
that obtaining a broader range of social views requires efforts to ensure socio-
economic and cultural inclusion. The use of trusted intermediaries or local
organisations that have strong support among the non-engaged can help
involve target groups that may distrust external actors. This would be especially
useful for working with immigrants or native populations. In such cases, use of
multilingual documents/information would also be helpful.
Incentives from the central government and from the local electorate are
important to motivate local governments to favour participation initiatives.
The choice to adopt an inclusive decision-making strategy depends to a
significant degree on the institutional incentives of local politicians, which
often depend on the demands made on local politicians by local actors and
community-based organisations (their electorate) and by the representatives
of the central government. In Chile, initiatives such as the Innovation and
Citizenry Award programme offer an incentive to participatory problem-
solving initiatives in the public realm, and an interesting way to exchange
information and good practices in local public affairs (see Box 3.17).
The presence of a wide range of community-based groups appears to be
an important element for citizen participation. In Chile, according to the Mas
Voces survey (2005), 18% of respondents said they had joined forces with other
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local residents to try to influence governmental decision making, and 45% of
this group reported that their efforts had received a positive response. These
findings, which are consistent with social capital research, support the notion
that membership in formal and informal groups and networks has a positive
effect on democratic development. It also suggests that there are still some
barriers to citizen engagement in such groups in Chile. Experience in OECD
countries has shown that strengthening transparency and openness in public
processes can help rebuild local actors’ confidence in overall government and
in the participative process. This, in turn, enables citizens to become more
engaged in participative processes. However, participation does not mean
including everyone every time. Broad public participation may not always be
productive. Excessive participation generates fatigue and a sense of time
wasted, particularly if there are opportunity costs, such as participating at the
expense of working time. Participation has to have a concrete goal and the
chance to influence the lives of those who participate.
Box 3.17. The Innovation and Citizenry Award programme
The Innovation and Citizenry Award programme organises an annual
competition for prizes in innovative approaches to participatory provision of
public goods and services in Chile (www.premioinnovacion.cl). The programme
is the product of a partnership between several civil society organisations,
including Universidad de Los Lagos, la Corporación Innovación y Ciudadanía
and the Ford Foundation. The goal of the award programme is to give public
recognition to self-organised and participatory problem-solving initiatives in
the public realm, and to document and learn from these experiences so that
they can benefit other actors struggling with similar problems in different
locations. Since its inception in 2000, the programme has been known to
serve as an important forum for exchange, learning and debate about new
ideas in local public affairs in Chile. In 2006, the programme received more
than 1 500 applications from local initiatives throughout the country. Out of
these, the ten most innovative approaches were awarded a grant of
USD 5 000 and another ten were given an honorary mention. Two municipal
governments and one regional government were awarded the prize. Apart
from stimulating local organisations and governments to develop new,
innovative approaches to effective problem solving in public affairs, the
programme serves a very important function of social learning that benefits
all actors involved in public affairs, not just those who win the prizes. Other
actors interested in public policy are able to learn about the winning
initiatives by reading about them in a variety of forums, including a
publication that documents the experience of all annual awardees, the
programme website, as well as an appealing magazine.
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E-Government
E-government and ICT have become major tools to help OECD public
administrations improve their relations with stakeholders and their
effectiveness. E-government provides online access to information and gives
citizens access to government services. It allows the sharing of information
and creates new channels for citizen engagement in the policy process
(OECD, 2007c). Since the 1990s, a number of initiatives to develop e-
government have been undertaken in Chile (see Box 3.18). However, as noted
in Chapter 1, interregional disparities in access to the Internet are still high
and represent a challenge that must be faced to spread the use of this tool to
the inhabitants of the less developed regions and rural localities.
Participation of the private sector and universities
The specific knowledge and the involvement of private-sector and civil
institutions (such as universities and research centres) can be essential for
regional development policy. Private-sector participation and public-private
co-operation can play an important role: the co-operation, co-ordination and
involvement of the different actors in diverse bodies (RDAs, coalitions,
participative councils) can help make better use of public funds by planning
and implementing policy options on the basis of the more comprehensive
knowledge of a variety of stakeholders. In Chile, the participation of micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMES) is crucial as they account for
more than 75% of jobs and face particular difficulties for coping with the
challenges of global competitiveness. The RDAs can serve as a mechanism for
involving MSMEs in regional productive planning. When MSMEs are
Box 3.18. E-government in Chile
In 2000 a Public Sector Reform and Modernisation Project (Proyecto de
Reforma y Modernizacion del Estado – PRYME) was established by the General
Presidential Secretariat Ministry with the aim of enhancing the co-ordination
of all aspects of e-government within the government. This project suggested
reforming the entire contracting and public procurement system, using the
Internet to introduce a fully online system. Within this framework,
Chilecompra was established with the goal to provide an innovative tool to
connect public buyers with providers through the Internet. Its objective is to
guarantee high levels of transparency, efficiency and use of technologies in
the public procurement market to the benefit of businessmen, public
agencies and citizens. It helps government agencies be more accessible,
efficient and transparent in their relationships with the citizenry, thanks to
the creation of the www.chilecompra.cl platform. 
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represented in the governing structures they can orient the action of these
agencies towards their specific requirements. Chile Emprende (see Chapter 2)
also represents an initiative for integrating the private sector and research
institutions in the management of an economic development programme. In
each region a regional branch, headed by the intendant, is composed of
regional public, private and academic institutions.
Finally, universities and research institutions in Chile have started to play
an active role in regional development initiatives, a process that should go
further. Currently universities participate in initiatives to promote innovation
(for instance as project partners in the regional scientific and technological
centres) and in business development programmes (collaborating with Chile
Emprende regional programmes or participating in strategic councils of
regional development agencies). However these efforts are still limited in
scope. To play a regional role and contribute to regional competitiveness,
these institutions must extend their activities beyond education and research.
Conclusion
Regional competitiveness requires context-sensitive responses which in
turn require a certain degree of decentralisation. Chapters 1 and 2 argue that
enhancing regional productivity and competitiveness in Chile will require a
shift towards regional policies capable of adapting to the different assets,
strengths and potentialities of specific locations. Chapter 3 has focused on
showing the governance challenges for implementing a territorial approach to
development in the Chilean context.
Chile has a long tradition of centralism, and its administrative system
has long been associated with economic efficiency and political stability.
Today, however, the role of decentralisation is being debated, with a focus on
improving regional performance and competitiveness. The current
government has set high priority on decentralisation with the aim of
providing sub-national governments with the tools, capacities and legitimacy
to improve their autonomy and performance. Among the main reforms
carried out in the latest period is the direct election of the regional council,
creating a democratically elected body for managing regional development.
Additionally, responsibility for regional planning has been transferred to the
recently created regional planning division of the regional government. A
municipal reform is also to be undertaken to modernise municipal
organisation and to give more autonomy and further responsibilities to
municipalities.
However, in spite of these efforts, progress remains modest. The strict
administrative framework of the central state places financial and
administrative limitations on Chile’s regional and municipal governments
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which may undermine their ability to carry out some of their responsibilities
efficiently and thus fail to take advantage of specific regional and local
opportunities. At the same time the benefits of initiatives such as the regional
development agencies, or the delegation of the regional planning
responsibility, are limited by an economic agenda largely designed at the
national level and by the lack of an institutional framework at the regional
level capable of co-ordinating the different policies, instruments and actors
involved in economic development.
Chile still requires at the sub-national level a stronger institutional
framework able to bring together and co-ordinate the different local players
and the various programmes and instruments designed to promote territorial
development. At the local level, most municipalities currently have neither
the resources nor the incentive to invest in local economic development
initiatives. Incentives are needed to strengthen both the capacities and
resources of municipalities (especially those of the least developed) to engage
in local economic development. Additionally, a co-ordinated local governance
structure will be needed, especially in big cities like Santiago, in order to
improve the harmonisation of different sectoral policies in the metropolitan
area (e.g. housing, land use planning and economic development) and to
improve co-ordination in the delivery of key public services (especially public
transport) across several municipalities within a functional city. On the other
hand, the strengthening of regional governance will also involve several
challenges. Territorial development strategies should be strengthened to
create a closer link between regional planning and investment portfolios. This
will give the regional government and the new planning division the
opportunity to play a stronger role in guiding an integrated approach to
regional development. However, it will also be necessary to give greater
powers to the regional government to allow it to be active in the discussion,
planning and co-ordination of regional development policies. National
institutions and agencies should strengthen their links and co-ordination
with the regional government in order to ensure that they have the capacity to
carry out efficiently the delegated responsibility of regional planning.
Matching the newly delegated responsibilities with technical and
administrative support and with institutional legitimacy for the actors
receiving an expanded public policy mandate will be crucial. In any
decentralisation process, the assignment of new responsibilities should be
accompanied by a concomitant allocation of the competences and resources
necessary to carry them out. This will require greater trust on the part of
national institutions in the competences of sub-national institutions. It will
also require greater co-operation between levels of government. Multi-level
governance and co-ordination arrangements, mechanisms to promote
capacity building and institutions for participation and accountability could
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help by raising regional governments’ capacities and strengthening the
legitimacy, coherence and effectiveness of the reform.
In addition to better co-ordination among levels of government and
greater involvement of sub-national governments in regional planning, it is
important for central policies for regional development to have a territorial
dimension. Central government agencies have a key role to play in promoting
place-based rather than one-size-fits-all policies, strengthening collaboration
among ministries and public agencies, and including local and regional
institutions in the design and co-ordination of national initiatives.
This review suggests that moving towards a territorial approach to
development in Chile will require further progress towards decentralisation.
However, decentralisation on its own will not necessarily lead to efficient and
integrated place-based policies. The key issue is likely to be the development
of a governance structure that fosters collaborative context-sensitive
interventions which respond to local particularities in terms of strengths,
opportunities and challenges. It will require greater co-operation between
levels of government and also greater involvement of sub-national
governments in co-ordinating, designing and managing their development.
However, decentralisation does not mean that the central government should
leave sub-national governments alone. The central government has a key role
to play in setting the general legal framework to enable virtuous relations,
both vertically among the different levels of governments and horizontally
among the different national sectoral policies and among the different regions
or municipalities.
Notes
1. Figure based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistic Yearbook, excluding grants from
other levels of government.
2. The provision of primary and secondary education and primary health are
competences transferred to the local level and are financed on a per pupil/per
patient subsidy by the central government. This grant is complemented by the
municipality’s own resources, and with funds from the FNDR. Yet, national
transfers to education subsidise both public education and private subsidised
schools. As regards the former, the per student transfer is delivered to
municipalities. In the case of the latter, the subsidy is run by the private sector.
Therefore, this transfer is only partially managed by municipalities.
3. A national law determines a minimum property value threshold. Under this limit
properties are exempted of the municipal property tax.
4. As mentioned, current expenditure on municipal education is financed with
national subsidies, combined with the municipality’s own resources (national
grants are not sufficient to finance municipal education). In addition, in small
municipalities student enrolment is low and so is the (per pupil) national subsidy.
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ANNEX 3.A1 
Empirical results on correlations between 
decentralisation and economic growth
Effect* Explanations Author (year) Data Sample
– (nonsign) Low capacity of local government, local expenditures are not 
growth-oriented, many counteracting forces.
Davoodi and Zou 
(1998)
1970-1989 World (n = 46)
+ (nonsign) Household mobility and spillover effects mediate decentralisation 
effect.
Crucq and 
Hemming (2007)
1978-2002 EU (n = 14)
+ When local governments compete citizens win. A better match 
between local needs and policy responses makes citizens and 
businesses more productive. 
Stansel (2005) 1960-1990 United States 
(n = 314)
– (nonsign) 
+ (nonsign)
Economic impact in cross-national studies loses significance when 
decentralisation is measured as the sub-national mandate to raise 
revenue.
Thornton (2007) 1980-2000 OECD (n = 19)
+ Fiscal decentralisation decreases the public sector’s share in the 
economy and this stimulates economic growth (significance in effect 
depends on whether country is unitary or federal and how 
decentralisation is measured).
Yilmaz (1999) 1971-1990 World (n = 46)
+ The effect of fiscal decentralisation is significant when controlling for 
historical, cultural and institutional variation. Only sub-national 
studies can control for such factors. 
Akai and Sakata 
(2002)
1992-1996 United States 
+ Decentralisation produces more accountability of public sector. 
Correlation is significant but no regression statistics are available. 
Hunter and Shah 
(1998)
1980-1993? World (n = 80)
+ Fiscal decentralisation in China increased efficiency of resource 
allocation by strengthening local incentives for local problem 
solving. 
Lin and Liu 
(2000)
1970-1993 China (n = 28)
– Provincial spending failed to deliver fast economic growth because 
projects financed by the central government are more crucial to 
growth. 
Zhang and Zou 
(1998)
1980-1992 China (n = 30)
– (nonsign) 
+ (nonsign)
The effects of decentralisation are more likely to be detected at the 
local level rather than in national growth rates. 
Woller and 
Phillips (1998)
1974-1991 World (n = 23)
– (nonsign) 
+ (nonsign) 
No discernible and consistent effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
economic growth when controlling for energy, investments, labour, 
income inequality and inflation.
Xie et al. (1999) 1949-1991 United States 
Curvilinear Positive effect when decentralisation is increasing from low to 
medium levels, but negative when increasing from medium to high.
Thiessen (2003) 1973-1998 OECD countries
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+ The positive effect of decentralisation depends on political 
freedom (interaction effect).
Iimi (2005) 1997-2001 World (n = 51)
–/+ Lower levels of economic growth in countries where devolution 
has been driven by the central government; greater growth in 
cases where regions have been the main drivers (Spain).
Rodrígez-Pose, 
Tijmstra and 
Bwire (2007)
1985-2002 Germany, India, 
Mexico, Spain 
and the United 
States 
–/+ Regional 
Disparities
Decentralisation in a context of liberalisation may lead to an 
increase in interregional disparities, with concentration of 
economic growth in dynamic regions.
Rodriguez-Pose 
and Gill (2004)
1980-1998 Mexico, Brazil, 
India, United 
States, Spain, 
China
* Positive or negative correlation between decentralisation and economic growth. “Nonsign” means that the analysis
did not find a statistically significant effect of decentralisation
Effect* Explanations Author (year) Data Sample
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ANNEX 3.A2 
Contextual factors explaining variation 
in decentralisation outcomes
Intervening factor Examples Studies
Characteristics of national regime that 
decentralises
Degree of economic development, democracy, 
government structure. At what stage of development is 
the country, and how decentralised is the pre-reform 
structure?
Litvack et al., 1998; Parker et al., 2000
Policy mix: Type of decentralisation 
considered
What is the extent of the decentralisation? Which 
authority, resources and responsibilities have been 
transferred, and to whom?
Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001
Central government monitoring and 
support
Training events, technical support, unannounced visits, 
accounting.
Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003
Supportive local networks Are there local organisations that support problem 
solving? 
Chhatre and Saberwal, 2006; Shah, 2004
Institutional, technical and 
administrative capacities
Extent to which local government has well-trained 
personnel, is able to organise and unite local actors.
Fiszbein, 1997; Pacheco, 2000 ; Angell 
et al., 2001
Institutions for participation and 
accountability
The existence of participatory decision making forums, 
ombudsman, public record keeping.
Ribot, 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998; Blair, 
2000
Local organisational culture and 
leadership
Local individuals gather and unite local people around 
a common cause.
Hildebrand and Grindle, 1995; 
Grindle, 2007
Financial resources Sufficient resources to fund most critical activities. Cohen and Peterson, 1996
Other public policies: External 
conditions
Macroeconomic and monetary policies may overpower 
the effects of the decentralisation reform.
Andersson and Gibson, 2007
Governance outcome measures The governance outcomes may be evaluated with 
different criteria and must be defined in light of specific 
policy objectives. The empirical relationships will differ 
depending on the outcome measures used (i.e. tax 
revenue raising, social spending, administrative 
efficiency, GDP/capita, etc.).
Sharma, 2006; Akai and Sakata, 2002
Nature of the goods and services Some goods and services may be more amenable to 
decentralisation than others. Technical support services 
for agricultural extension are quite different from 
primary education, health care, and tax collection. 
World Bank, 2005
